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2The study of regional international financial
centers is a long-neglected subject. In the liter-
ature on international finance, it is customaryto
consider the world as consisting of separate na-
tional money and capital markets, linked to-
gether by international capital flows, with each
national marketassumed to be a uniform, homo-
geneous entity. Alternatively, the entire world is
regarded as a single market in which competition
for national funds takes place through various
institutional channels such as banks, interna-
tional bond markets, etc. By and large, these
analytical approaches have served their pur-
poses welL But, with their emphasis onnational
and international developments, they do not
take into considerationthe rise in the lastdecade
or so of regional international financial centers
such as Singapore, Panama, and the U.S. West
Coast. These new regional centers have con-
tributed importantly to the growth of interna-
tional finance by being both competitive with,
and complementary to, old-established centers
such as London, New York, and
Zurich.
A number of studies have now appeared on
various regional financial centers, both old and
new, but none as yet onthe rise of the U.S. West
Coast as an international financial center. The
purpose of this study is to fin that gap.
Economic Factors
Despite these recent contributions, a concep-
tual framework for the study of regional finan-
cial centers is still lacking. Regional economics,
with its sophisticated theoretical models of loca-
tional distribution of industry and intra-urban
land use, 2 rarely concerns itselfwith the location
offinance. There appears to be no obvious way
toapplythe factor-endowment approach
(Heckscher-Ohlin) or the distance-from-center
approach (von Thunen) used in regional eco-
nomics to the explanation of regional financial
centers. On the other hand, a growing literature
onthe pivotal role of money and capital markets
in economic development" leaves largely unex-
plored the question of the location of financial
centers and the functional links among these
centers.
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Itis beyond the scope of this study to develop
a rigorous theoretical framework for analyzing
the factors underlying the rise and fall of re-
gional international financial centers. Neverthe-
less, it would be useful to consider briefly a few
relevant hypotheses in economic literature that
might throw light on the subject.
First, we may consider the portfolio-balance
theory offinance, as used in the anafysis of inter-
national diversification of asset-holdings and in-
ternational capital flows.' In essence, it states
that an asset-holder (say, a bank) that desires
maximum return from his investment portfolio
with minimum risk can improve his welfare
through international diversification of his asset
holdings, and that his gains are the larger the less
(algebraically) the returns from the various as-sets arecorrelatedwith one another. This paper
contains partial evidence suggesting that, in the
1973-74 environment, an internationally diver-
sified portfolio apparently assisted a number of
West Coast banks in improving their overall
earnings.
Second, we may consider economies of scale.
The portfolio-balance theory, while accounting
for banks' desire for international asset diver-
sification, can not tell us why, at one particular
juncturein the early 1970's, so manyWest Coast
banks initiated orexpanded international activi-
ties. Obviously, overseas branching is costly,
requiring a certain minimum scale of operations
to undertake. In this respect, it maybepertinent
to note that loans and investments of all com-
mercial banks in the San Francisco Federal Re-
serve District nearly doubled from $51 billion
in 1967 to $101 billion in 1974, increasing at an
average rate of 10 percent per year.
5 Presum-
ably, during this period a number of West Coast
banks must have attained a size sufficiently large
for them to initiate profitable international
operations.
Third, growth of international banking is re-
lated to that of international trade. Between
1967 and 1974, the total value of West Coast
foreign trade (exports plus imports) rose three
and a half times to $37 billion"-at an average
growth rate of 24 percent per year. About two-
thirds of this trade was conducted with the
booming economies of the countries located
around the Pacific Basin.
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Fourth, insights obtained from studies of in-
dustrial structure might throw some additional
light on the subject. Among the West Coast
banks now active in international banking, by
far the largest are California banks. Besides its
substantial economic base, California is also
noted for a liberal banking law that permits
statewide branching. Presumably, the resultant
sharp competition among banks may have
driven profits from domestic operations down
to a level that provided a strong incentive for
expansion in areas where competitive conditions
were less severe, as in the less-developed areas
of the world.
Keeping these factors in mind, we may now
turn to an examination of the rise of the West
Coast as an international financial center during
the 1970's. Following a quick overview, we will
look into the various components of the growth
process: the overseas expansion of West Coast
banks, the activities of Edge Act corporations
on the West Coast, and the activities of foreign
banks in the region. One section analyzes the
experience of West Coast banks during the tur-
bulent 1974-75 period, and another the profit-
ability of international operations. Finally,
some preliminary conclusions are drawn con-
cerning the future of the West Coast as an inter-
national financial center.
Overview of Growth, 1969-75
Table 1 summarizes the growth ofWest Coast
international banking from 1969 to 1975. Not
all the series are available for the entire period,
but the overall impression of rapid growth is
unmistakable.
Between 1969 and 1974, total foreign assets
of West Coast banks increased from $7 billion
to $32 billion.s Moreover, there was a broad
participation of West Coast banks in this rapid
expansion. In 1969, onlyfive West Coast banks
had more than $100 million in foreign assets;"




Five of these banks-Bank of America, Security
Pacific, United California, Wells Fargo, and
Crocker-each had more than $1 billion in for-
eign assets; together the five accounted for $30
billion of the $32 billion of total foreign assets
of all West Coastbanks in 1974.
The numberofbanks havingbranches abroad
increased from nine in 1969 to twenty in 1975.
The number of branches rose from 102 to 138,
and the numberof representative offices from 28
to 61, while foreign-branch assets jumped from
$5.6 billion to $35.7 billion.Table 1




Total foreign assets oi
West Coast banks
(billions of dollars) 7.0 32.0
Overseas Branches
Number of West Coast
banks 9 20
Number of branches 102 138
Branch assets (billions
of dollars) 5.6 35.7
Number of representative





of dollars) 80 930
Foreign Banks
Number of agencies
and branches 16 50
Agency assets (billions
of dollars) 0.7 9.0
Numberofsubsidiary banks 7 15
Subsidiary bank assets
(billions of dollars) 0.9 4.5
aData for total foreign assets are as ofend-1969 and end-
1974; overseas branch data, end-1969 and end-I975;
Edge corporation data, end-1969 and mid-1975; and
foreign bank data, mid-1969 and mid-I975.
Sources: Based on subsequent tables.
Increased activities of Edge Act corporations
also testified to the growth ofinternationalbank-
ing in the region. The number of such corpora-
tions increased from 7 in 1969 to 23 in 1975,
while their total assets increased more than 11
times from $80 million in 1969 to $930 million
in 1975.
Another measure was the expansion of for-
eign banks' activities on the West Coast. Agen-
cies and branches of foreign banks increased
from 16 in 1969 to 50 in 1975, and foreign-
owned state-chartered banks increased from 7
to 15. The total assets of these foreign banking
offices increased from $1.6 billion in 1969 to
$13.5 billion in 1975.
The growth phenomenon was also reflected
in a substantially enlarged volume of interna-
tional capital flows reported by West Coast
banking institutions. Over the 1974-75 period,
U.S. capital outflows reported by West Coast
banks (measured by changes in U.S. foreign
assets) averaged $3.2 billion per year, or about
18 times the average rate of the 1969-70period.
Foreign capital inflows reported by West Coast
banks (measured by changes in U.S. foreign lia-
bilities) averaged $740 million per year during
the 1975-75 period, or about three times the av-
erage 1969-70 rate. U.S. capital outflows
through West Coast banks accounted for 20 per-
cent, andforeign capitalinflows 6 percent, ofthe
respective total flows reported by all U.S. banks
during the 1974-75 period. By coincidence,
these percentages were almost the same as the
West Coast banks' shares at the end of 1975 in
the total U.S. claims on foreigners and liabilities
to foreigners reported by banks-20 percent
and 7 percent, respectively.'1
Overseas Branch Activities
West Coast banks were relatively late starters
in overseas banking. As late as 1968, Bank of
America was the only West Coast bank with
branches abroad, although a few others-Bank
ofCalifornia, Crocker, United California, Wells
Fargo, Security Pacific, and National Bank of
Commerce of Seattle (now Rainier)-main-
tained representative offices and interests in joint
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ventures in a handful of foreign countries.'2
Bank of America opened its first foreign
branch in 1931, but did not add another until
1947. It added a total of 21 foreign branches in
the 1947-63 period. But then, in a burst of ex-
pansion covering the 1964-68 period, it opened
another 64 branches-more than one new over-
seas branch a month on the average. Despite aTable 2
Growth In Overseas Operations of Individual Banks
1969·1974
(Deposit and loan volume In mlilions of dollars)'
1969 1974 Ratio: 1974/1969
Bank of America
Deposits: Total 21,509 45,348 2.11
Overseas 5,040 18,110 3.59
Percent Overseas 23% 40%
Loans: Total 13,842 27,649 1.99
Overseas 2,402 8,459 3.52
Percent Overseas 17% 31%
Secnrity Pacific
Deposits: Total 4,474 10,047 2.25
Overseas 20 2,276 113.80
Percent Overseas 0% 23%
Loans: Total 3,873 8,612 2.22
Overseas 36 1,068 29.67
Percent Overseas 1% 12%
United California
Deposits: Total 3,934 7,098 1.80
Overseas 270 1,799 6.66
Percent Overseas 7% 25%
Loans: Total 2,709** 5,114 1.89t
Overseas 87** 598 6.87t
Percent Overseas 3% 12%
Wells Fargo
Deposits: Total 4,542 9,065 2.00
Overseas 101 1,670 16.53
Percent Overseas 2% 18%
Loans: Total 3,386 7,336 2.17
Overseas 29 941 32.45
Percent Overseas 1% 13%
Crocker
Deposits: Total 4,169 7,896 1.89
Overseas 283 1,431 5.06
Percent Overseas 7% 18%
Seattle First
Deposits: Total 1,612 3,118 1.93
Overseas 2 354 177.00
Percent Overseas 0% 11%
Loans: Total 1,187 2,317 1.95
Overseas 3 117 39.00
Percent Overseas 0% 5%
RainierH
Deposits: Total 1,078 1,861 1.72
Overseas 90 298 3.31
Percent Overseas 8% 16%
Loans: Total 683 1,271 1.86
Overseas II 130 11.82
Percent Overseas 2% 10%
*Daily or weekly average balances.
"1970
tRatio. 197411970.
ttExcluding Edge Act subsidiaries.
Sources: J974 Annual Reports of the respective banks.
12lJapan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Philippines, Malay-
sia, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia.
Source: Based on data reported by banks to the Federal
Reserve System.
Table 3
Total Assets of Foreign Branches
of West Coast Banks, by Region
December 31, 1975
were by 1974 a substantial portion of portfolios
for all these institutions-from a high of 40
percent for Bank of America to between 10 and
20 percent at otherbanks.
Overseas operations have remained heavily
concentrated in Europe and the Caribbean (Ta-
ble 3), reflecting the importance of Eurodollar
operations. The only other measurable activity
was in Pacific Basin countries-almost entirely
in Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong.
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Besides overseas branches, West Coast banks
also have invested large sums in foreign affiliates
which are engaged in all sorts of banking or
near-banking activities. These activities include
merchant banking, investment banking, finance
companies, leasing, mortgage, trust, factoring,
etc. Dataonthe amounts involved, however, are
lacking.
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later slowdown in the expansion pace, it main-
tained atthe endof 1975 a network of107 over-
seas branches and 13 foreign representative of-
fices, with $33 billion in weekly average assets
inthe bank's Worid Bankingdivision-about54
percent of the bank's total average assets.
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Other West Coast banks started overseas
branching in 1968, with the opening of a Lon-
don branch by National Bank of Commerce of
Seattle. As shown in Table 1, by the end of
1969 there were nine West Coast banks with
overseas branches,"! with total branch assets
amounting to $5.6 billion. However, aside from
Bank of America branches, all were located in
either London, the Bahamas, or Luxembourg.
During the six years 1970-75, 11 other West
Coast banks opened branches abroad.
15 The
combined assets of the foreign branches of all
West Coast banks increased to $35.7 billion at
the end of 1975.
16 During this period, they un-
dertook extensive branching activities in Japan
and other countries in the FarEast
These aggregate data reveal little about the
operations of individual banks. However, seven
individual banks report considerable detail in
their annual reports to stockholders (Table 2).
Over the 1970-74 period, total loans and de-
posits of each of seven major West Coast banks
about doubled; but in all cases, their overseas
loans and deposits grew at a much faster pace.
Overseas operations more than tripled for Bank
of America, an established international-bank-
ing institution, and jumped over a hundred-fold
for such newcomers as Seattle First and Security
Pacific. As a result, overseas loans and deposits
Edge Act Corporationson the West Coast
Edge Act Corporations are wholly-owned
subsidiaries of U.S. banks set up under Section
25 (a) of the Federal Reserve Act to facilitate
international banking activities. They may be
established in states outside their parent banks'
home states, and therefore represent an excep-
tion to the usual barriers against interstate
branching by U.S. banks. This provision en-
ables banks which are located outside major fi-
nancial centers to engage in international bank-
ing in such centers; on the other hand, it also
permits banks which are located in one major
financial center to participate in international
banking in other centers. The establishment of
a large number of out-of-state Edge corpora-
tions in a region is, therefore, a good sign of the
region's growing importance as an international
financial center.
13In addition to their international banking ac-
tivities, Edge corporations may also make equity
investments in foreign corporations which do
not transact business in the United States-an
activity which their parent banks are prohibited
by law from doing. Hence, many banks which
are located in an international financial center
may setup Edgecorporations in the same locale,
often on the same premises, for conducting in-
ternational equity-investment businesses. These
Edge corporations are commonly referred to as
"investment Edges," in contrast to the "banking
Edges" described above.
Edge activity on the West Coast was quite
modest until recently. As late as 1965, there
were only three such corporations: a banking
Edge in Seattle (International Bank of Com-
merce) and two investment Edges in San Fran-
cisco (Crocker International and Bank of Cali-
fornia International). In 1967, First National
City Bank of New York opened a banking Edge
in San Francisco-the first representative from
outside the region-and then five West Coast
banks (Security Pacific, Bank of America, U.S.
National of Oregon, Seattle First, and Union)
established investment Edges. By the end of
1969, seven Edge corporations were operating
on the West Coast, but with total assets of only
$80 million.
The big wave hit the West Coast in 1973 and
1974, when ten new Edge corporations were es-
tablished-mostly from outside the region-
raising the total number to 23 and their aggre-
gate assets to $1 billion. The wave then appears
to have subsided, as the total assets fell to $930
million by mid-1975,lB and the number dropped
to 22 with the merger of two investment-Edge
subsidiaries of Crocker in August 1975. Today,
there are 13 bankingEdges-8 from New York,
3 from Chicago, and 1 each from Boston and
Seattle-along with 9 investment Edges which
all represent West Coast institutions.
Measured by asset size, the bankingEdges are
far more important than investment Edges. At
mid-1975, banking Edges had total assets of
$841 million, compared to only $88 million for
all investment Edges. Activity is largely concen-
trated in San Francisco ($418 million in assets)
and Los Angeles ($500 million), with the bal-
ance about equally distributed between Portland
and Seattle.
Foreign Banks on the West Coast
Most foreign banks on the West Coastuse the
agency form, rather than the branch form of or-
ganization.
20 The latter is effectively barred
from California, because the state requires all
domestic deposits to be insured by the FDIC,
and the FDIC insures only U.S.-chartered
banks. A similar situation exists in Oregon, al-
though the branches of two foreign banks-
Bank of Tokyo and Canadian Imperial-have
"grandfather" privileges there. The state of
Washington permits branches of foreign banks,
but with domestic deposits severely limited by
law, the branches in effect act much like agen-
cies. The most effective arrangement has
evolved in California, where foreign banks have
established both agencies and full-service state-
chartered subsidiary banks, in an attempt to ob-
tain flexibility in both lendinglimits and deposit-
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accepting capabilities.
21 In fact, each of the 15
foreign banking subsidiaries in California, ex-
cept for Lloyds, operates in tandem with an
agency of the same parentbank.
Foreign banks came early to the West Coast.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce opened
an agency in San Francisco in 1902, and Bank
of Montreal established a subsidiarybank in San
Francisco in 1918 and an agency there in 1934.
OtherCanadian and FarEasternbanks followed
in the 1930s and after the Second World War.
Yet by mid-1969, there were only seven foreign
subsidiary banks and sixteen agencies and
branches of foreign banks on the West Coast,
with assets totaling about $1.5 billion.
The pace of expansion was relatively slow
until mid-1971. But within the next four years,
29 new agencies and 8 banking subsidiariesopened in California and 4 new branches opened
in Seattle. At mid-l975, agency and branch
assets totaled $9.0 billion and subsidiary-bank
assets $4.5 billion-13 times and 9 times their
respective sizes only six years earlier. Within
the same period, their share of all commercial-
bank assets within the San Francisco Federal
Reserve District increased from 2.1 percent to
9.8 percent.
Foreign banks prefer California to any other
state (except New York) as a place to conduct
business. As oflastSeptember, 66 branches and
agencies were located in New York, 43 in Cali-
fornia, and 35 elsewhere; while 16 subsidiary
banks were in New York, 15 in California, and
only 2 elsewhere. New York accounted for 68
percent, California 26 percent, and other re-
gions only 6 percent, of the $56.5 billion total
assets of all the foreign banking offices in the
United States.
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Banks from thirteen foreign countries in Asia,
Europe, and the Americas are now represented
on the West Coast. The Japanese banks account
for a full two-thirds of the $13.5 billion total
assets of all foreign bankingoffices in California;
four British banks account for 15 percent; six
Canadian banks for 9 percent; and seventeen
other foreign banks for the other 9 percent.2:'
Foreign banks bring to a region financial ex-
pertise and special ties with foreign business
partners which local banks do not possess.
Their comparative advantage in this respect en-
ables them to overcome thecultural andbusiness
barriers of entry into a (for them) foreign envi-
ronment. Being complementary to the indig-
enous banks, foreign banks help to broaden and
strengthen a region's institutional base as an in-
ternational financial center. In addition, as they
become established in the new market, they help
to enhance competition by offering local savers
and borrowers a greater choice of financial
services.
Recent Developments
Nineteen seventy-four was a particularly tur-
bulent period for international banking. The
lifting of U.S. capital controls in January 1974
coincided with the liberalization of controls over
international capital flows by other major indus-
trial countries. This coordinated shift in policy
occurred just as the world's major banks were
called upon to help manage the huge flows of
international oil payments. At the time, there
was widespread concern over the banks' ability
to handl~ such flows and to bear the risks in-
volved. Then in May, 1974, came the Franklin
National failure, followed soon afterby the Her-
statt debacle and a series of other international
banking failures and near-failures. On top of it
all, inflation became rampant worldwide, caus-
ing interest rates to soar and the world bond
market to decline during a time of large inter-
national-payments imbalances. From late 1974
on, a spreading business recession engulfed the
world, with declining export markets, falling
commodity prices, and continually rising import
costs seriously undermining the payments posi-
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tions of a number of developing nations and
forcing them to seek substantial loans from the
banking system. Through it all, international
banking underwent considerable strains while
offering unprecedented opportunities as well.
How did West Coast banks manage through
that period of perils and opportunities? In re-
sponse to the lifting of capital controls and to
the world-wide demand for the financing of oil
deficits, West Coast banks stepped up their for-
eign lending very sharply during the second
quarter of 1974, both at their head offices and
through their foreign branches, as shown in Ta-
ble 4. Following the Herstatt debacle, they dras-
tically reduced their lending activities, leading
to a substantial net liquidation of head-office
loans during the third quarter and of foreign
branch loans in the fourth quarterof 1974. Sub-
sequently, however, foreign lending recovered
momentum, and head-oftice lending even sur-
passed the 1973-74 pace.
Thus, in fact, West Coast banks did not un-
dergo as much of a "consolidation and retrench-Table 4
InternaticnalActivities of





West Coast Banks Branches
Changein Changein Change in
Foreign Foreign Total
Period Assets Liabilities Assets
1973 1 515 173 1,944
1974 I 537 260 1,199
II 2,138 186 4,458
III - 705 766 1,887
IV 487 391 191
1975 I 1,123 68 394
II 587 143 528
III 780 88 458
IV 1,529 41 2,403
'Quarterly average.
Source: Basedon datareportedby banks tothe Federal
Reserve System and the U.S. Treasury.
ment" in1974 as was alleged in the financial
press. Reports of "anage of expansion in inter-
national banking coming to an end" were un-
founded. Measured by banks' foreign claims,
any retrenchment.was quite brief~lasting no
more than one quarterQf a year. Foreignlend-
ing resumed growth at both head offices and
foreign branches in 1975, although the foreign-
branch expansion was at a slower. pace than
previously.
Profitabilityof International Operations
The feature attracting banks to international
operations must be their profitability. Indeed, a
recent industry study shows that the interna-
tional earnings of a group of nine major U.S.
banks increased at a 37-percent annual rate over
the 1970-74 period, compared to only a 3-per-
cent rate of gain for domestic earnings.
24 Com-
parable datafor West Coastbanks are not avail-
able for that period, but scattered data for 1973
and 1974show the same type ofupsurge in over-
seas earnings (Table 5). In the three cases
shown, earnings from international operations
grew considerably faster than domestic earnings

























1974 1973 1974 Changes 1973
Bank ofAmerica
Total 49,400 60,400 +22% 219
International 18,000 25,000 +39% 70
Domestic 31,400 35,400 +13% 149
Security Pacific
Total 9,756 12,069 +24% 60.0
International 808 1,068 +32% 5.4
Domestic 8,948 11,001 +23% 54.6
Seattle First
Total 3,595 4,190 +17% 25.5
International 89 117 +31% 1.5
Domestic 3,506 4,073 +16% 24.0
Source: Estimated on basis of data in 1974 Annual Reports
16ica's international earnings increased 43 per-
cent, compared to only 5 percent for domestic
earnings; those of Seattle First increased by 127
percent, compared to only 9 percent for domes-
tic earnings; and those of Security Pacific by 24
percent, compared to an 11 percent decrease in
domestic earnings.
To a large extent, the faster increase in inter-
national earnings can be attributed to a greater
growth rate in international assets than in do-
mestic assets. Indeed, between 1973 and 1974,
Bank of America's international assets grew by
39 percent, compared to 13 percent for domes-
tic assets; while the comparable figures were 31
to 16 percent for Seattle First and 32 to 23 per-
cent for Security Pacific.
If the average rate of return is measured by
the ratio of earnings to assets, then changes in
the profitability of an operation can be mea-
sured by the difference between the earning-
growth rates and asset-growth rates. Thus, on
the basis of the data in Table 5, the profitability
of Bank of America's international operations
appears to have improved slightly between 1973
and 1974; while Seattle First's improved enor-
mously, and Security Pacific's declined some-
what. In contrast, the three banks' domestic
profitability all declined sharply, apparently as
a result of the U.S. recession in 1974. Thus, in
two of the three cases examined, increased prof-
itability in international operations provided a
cushion against the decline in profitability of
domestic operations. Even in the third case,
where international profitability also declined,
the absolute increase in such earnings helped to
offset the decline in domestic earnings.
A similarpicture is presentedbyrecentlypub-
lished 1975 data for Bank of America (Table
6). Clearly, the 23-percent growth in its inter-
national earnings in 1975 remained considerably
above its 12-percent growth of domestic earn-
ings. (The comparable growth figures for 1974
were 43 percent and 5 percent, respectively.)
When deflated by the respective growth rates in
earning assets, the bank's international profit-
ability continued to improve, and its domestic
profitability to deteriorate in 1975.
Table 6
BankAmerica Corporation
Growth in Earnings and Assets
International and Domestic
1974-1975
Average Earnings Average Earning Assets
1974 1975 Increase 1974 1975 Increase
(Million $) (Percent) (Siiiion $) (Percent)
Total 257 302 17.5 43.5 49.3 13.3
International
l 136 167 22.8 23.9 27.1 13.4
Domestic 121 135 11.6 19.6 22.2 13.3
'World Banking Division. Data differ from the corresponding figures presented in Table 5, because of "profit center
changes, changes in international allocation ofoverhead expenses and risk changes and improvements in building block
system."
Source: BankAmerica Corporation, Annual Report 1975, p. 50.
17Conclusion
As stated atthe outset, the rise of regional fi~
nancial centers has beenoneofthe most interest~
ing developments of the past decade in interna~
tional .finance. These newly~developedcenters
both complement and compete with old~estab~
Iished centers in the allocation of the world's
financial resources. To the extent that these
centers have provided closer contacts between
international and regional sources and users of
funds, they have enhanced the efficiency of in~
ternational financial markets. Moreover, they
have undoubtedly added to the prosperity and
economic growth of the regions in which the
centers are located.
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This paper has traced the rise of the U.S.
West Coast as an international financial center.
The rise has been remarkably rapid since 1969.
In terms of both the volume of capitalflows and
the worldwide financial interests represented,
the West Coast has become today a significant
factor in international finance.
Economic theory has largely ignored the phe~
nomenon of regional financial centers. Yet, for
both regional economics and development eco~
nomics, it should be a topic of considerable in~
terest. Recent contributions to economic analy~
sis have emphasized the central role of financial
markets in promoting economic growth. To a
large extent, the analysis should be applicable
to both developed and developing economies.
Regional financial centers have evolved in both
types of economies to provide important links
between national money and capital markets on
the one hand and broader world markets (such
as the Euro~currency market) on the other. Fur~
ther, the regional clustering of international
banking institutions suggests that the optimal
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geographic size of financial markets is perhaps
smallerthan a large country (such as the United
States) and larger thanmost smallcountries.
At the present stage of knowledge, this paper
is more concerned with what has occurred than
with why. Nevertheless, the brief discussion of
economic factors suggests that as commercial
banking expanded on the West Coast, a growing
number of banks in the past decade attained a
size sufficiently large to reapthe benefits of in~
ternational portfolio diversification. Available
profits data appear to reinforce the impression
that banks were indeed able to reap suchbene~
fits by balancing declining domestic loan de~
mand (dueto theU.S. recession) with increased
international loan demand (due to large pay~
ments deficits abroad).
Anotherkey factor has been the rapid growth
of West Coast international trade, which has at~
tracted many Edge corporations and foreign
banks to the region while inducing domestic
banks to start or expand their own international
operations. In 1975, the growth of trade slowed
down considerably as a result of the worldwide
recession. Nevertheless, as many as seven new
agencies and branches of foreign banks were
opened on the West Coast, and nine new
branches of West Coast banks were established
abroad. Thus, it appears thatthe banking indus~
try's interest in international banking on the
West Coast remained undaunted by the reces~
sion. Both domestic and foreign banks appar~
entlY saw the need to maintain their present
stake in the market, and thus set the groundwork
for further profitable operations in the years
ahead.FOOTNOTES
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